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Warrantless Aerial Surveillance After Ciraolo
and Dow Chemical: The Omniscient
Eye in the Sky
It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the
time. . . . You had to live--did live, from habit that became
instinct-in the assumption that every sound you made was over-
heard, and except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.
-G. Orwell, 1984*
I. INTRODUCTION
Aerial surveillance permits law enforcement officials to intrude
visually into areas that would be difficult or impossible to observe
from the ground.1 Although aerial surveillance is a valuable law
enforcement tool,2 it clearly invades the privacy of an individual's
outdoor activities. Numerous courts, however, have held that the
individual has no right to expect solitude from government intru-
sions upon outdoor activities.'
* G. ORWELL, 1984, at 6-7 (1949).
1. Tell, Suits Sight Spies in Sky, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 15, 1980, at 28, col. 1. For a
discussion of aerial surveillance prior to the Supreme Court's ruling on this issue, see
Granberg, Is Warrantless Aerial Surveillance Constitutional?, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 451 (1980);
Kaye, Aerial Surveillance: Private Versus Public Expectations, 56 CAL. ST. B.J. 258
(1981); Note, Aerial Surveillance. Overlooking the Fourth Amendment, 50 FORDHAM L.
REV. 271 (1981); Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Cur-
tains for the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 725 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Curtilage];
Comment, Police Helicopter Surveillance, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 145 (1973); Comment, Police
Helicopter Surveillance and Other Aided Observations: The Shrinking Reasonable Expec-
tation of Privacy, I 1 CAL. W.L. REV. 505 (1975); Comment, Aerial Surveillance: A Plane
View of the Fourth Amendment, 18 GONZ. L. REV. 307 (1982-1983); Comment, Aerial
Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455 (1984); Recent
Development, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitutional Analysis, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 409 (1982).
2. See Amicus Brief of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement at 7, California v.
Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986). In 1982, at least seventy percent of the domestic mari-
juana seized by the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement during search warrant
executions resulted from officers initially observing the contraband from an aerial vantage
point. Id. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement estimated that ninety-five per-
cent of its cultivated marijuana seizures resulted from initial aerial surveillance. Id.
Aerial surveillance is used not only by narcotics enforcement agencies, but also by
other government agencies, including the United States military for national defense, the
Army Corps of Engineers for flood control, the United States Forest Service to monitor
changes in vegetation, and the United States Geological Survey for mapmaking. See
Wash. Post., Dec. 9, 1985, at AI, col. 1, A12, col. 1.
3. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1827 (no right to
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In California v. Ciraolo4 and Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States,5 the Supreme Court held that individuals and business pro-
prietors do not have a fourth amendment right to expect privacy in
the outdoor areas of residential and commercial property.6 In both
cases, the Court looked to the intrusiveness of the government sur-
veillance technique.7 The Court concluded that the government's
use of airplanes and sophisticated cameras in the navigable air-
space was not intrusive enough to constitute a search, triggering
fourth amendment protection. s
This note will sketch the evolution of fourth amendment juris-
prudence. Beginning with the trespass doctrine, the note will dis-
cuss how fourth amendment focuses have vacillated between
concepts of property and privacy rights. After an examination of
the lower courts' treatment of aerial surveillance, the note will dis-
cuss Ciraolo and Dow Chemical. Finally, the note will consider the
practical and theoretical ramifications of Ciraolo and Dow
Chemical.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION
A. From the Trespass Doctrine to the Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy Test
Any fourth amendment 9 analysis requires an inquiry into
privacy from aerial surveillance in the outdoor areas of a tightly secured business com-
plex); Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813 (no right to privacy in backyard, patio, and pool area
from aerial surveillance); United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir. 1980) (no
right to privacy in outdoor areas of a coastal ranch), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981);
United States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (no right to privacy in
open fields).
4. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
5. Id. at 1819.
6. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1827 (aerial surveillance of private commercial prop-
erty); Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813 (aerial surveillance of residential property).
7. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1826-27; Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
8. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1827; Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813. The Court in Dow
Chemical and Ciraolo did not address "aerial surveillance[s] in airspace not dedicated to
public use and in which the underlying property owner has interests sufficient to be sub-
ject to a compensable taking." People v. Sabo, 185 Cal. App. 3d 845, 853, 230 Cal. Rptr.
170, 175 (1986).
9. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
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whether the governmental intrusion constituted a search' ° or
seizure." Early courts measured fourth amendment rights in
terms of property concepts. 12 Accordingly, those courts defined a
search as a physical government intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area and thus developed the trespass doctrine.' 3 Consti-
tutionally protected areas were confined to those areas explicitly
protected by the fourth amendment, including persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects. " Hence, the fourth amendment primarily pro-
tected property interests from unreasonable intrusions by the
government. 15
Under the trespass doctrine, in the absence of a physical intru-
sion upon a constitutionally protected area, evidence obtained by
naked or artificially magnified human senses did not constitute a
search.' 6 For example, in 1928, the Supreme Court held that the
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The fourth amendment applies to the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). For a scholarly discussion
on the history of the fourth amendment, see J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND
THE SUPREME COURT 19-42 (1966); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13-105 (1937); T.
Taylor, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24-46 (1969). For an an-
alytical framework regarding search and seizure law, see C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 4.1-4.4, at 85-109 (1980).
10. The Supreme Court has defined "search" for purposes of the fourth amendment
by looking to property concepts, individual privacy rights, and more recently, the intru-
siveness of the manner of surveillance. See, e.g., Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986)
(the sophistication of the surveillance technique); Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986) (the
intrusiveness of the search); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" standard); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (tres-
pass doctrine, i.e., a physical trespass on those areas explicitly protected by the fourth
amendment). See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 2.1, at 222-24 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter W. LAFAVE].
11. A "seizure" of property occurs when there is a "meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interest in that property." United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
712 (1984). See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 10, 2.1, at 221.
12. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928); Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942). For examples of cases applying the trespass doctrine,
also known as the "constitutionally protected areas" analysis, see Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 51-53 (1967) (installation of electronic eavesdropping devices in attorney's
office was impermissible intrusion into a constitutionally protected area); Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961) (installation of "spike mike" in the wall of sus-
pect's house was impermissible); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 752-53 (1952)
(the use of an electronic eavesdropping device not a search).
14. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356-
57 (1973).
15. See Comment, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REV. 191, 192 (1986).
16. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928). In Olmstead, the
Supreme Court adopted the English maxim from Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr.
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use of a wiretap to overhear telephone conversations did not con-
stitute a search because the government had not physically entered
the defendant's home. 7 Hence, the technological development of
electronic surveillance permitted the government to invade inti-
mate home activities without violating the fourth amendment.",
Consequently, protections under the trespass doctrine were
limited.
Application of the trespass doctrine also led to absurd constitu-
tional distinctions. For example, if police officers placed an elec-
tronic eavesdropping device against the wall of the defendant's
hotel room, no trespass was committed, and consequently, fourth
amendment protections were not triggered.1 9 On the other hand, if
law enforcement authorities used a thumbtack to hold an elec-
tronic listening device against the wall of a constitutionally pro-
tected area2° or if they placed the device within the wall,21 a
physical trespass, and consequently a search, was deemed to have
occurred.22 In each of these latter situations, the Court held the
warrantless searches unreasonable.23
In 1967, the Supreme Court extinguished such technical discus-
sions by overruling the trespass doctrine.24 In Katz v. United
States,25 the Court determined that a fourth amendment search
could occur in the absence of a physical intrusion upon a constitu-
tionally protected area.26 FBI agents in Katz acted without a war-
rant and attached electronic listening and recording devices to the
exterior of a public telephone booth.2 7 Thereafter, the agents lis-
tened to the defendant's conversation. 28 On the basis of these con-
versations, the defendant was convicted of transmitting wagering
1029, 1066 (1765), that in the absence of a physical trespass, the eye or ear alone could
not commit a search. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-66.
17. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464-66.
18. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942).
19. Id.
20. Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (per curiam).
21. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). In Silverman, the Court refused
to sanction the warrantless use of an electronic listening device that penetrated the wall of
an adjoining house and touched the heating ducts of the defendant's home. Id. at 509.
22. See supra note 19-20 and accompanying text.
23. Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. at 158; Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. at 509.
24. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). The Court stated that "the
underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded . . . that the 'trespass'
doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling." Id.
25. Id. at 347.
26. Id. at 353.
27. Id. at 348.
28. Id.
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information.29
Before the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the gov-
ernment should not have been permitted to introduce the tape re-
corded fruits of the eavesdrop into evidence.3" The Court agreed
and reversed, concluding that the electronic eavesdropping of a
closed public telephone booth constituted an unreasonable search
under the fourth amendment because it "violated the privacy upon
which [the caller] justifiably relied . ,,3I The Katz Court also
noted that, absent a few well-delineated exceptions, warrantless
searches were presumptively unreasonable under the fourth
amendment.32 Because electronic surveillance did not fall within
an exception to the warrant requirement,3 the Court concluded
that the search violated the fourth amendment.34
In overruling the trespass doctrine, the Katz Court changed the
focus of fourth amendment analyses from the reasonableness of in-
trusions on property interests to the reasonableness of the govern-
mental invasions upon personal privacy interests. 35 Thus, under
Katz, the fourth amendment protected that which an individual
sought to preserve as private, even in areas accessible to the
public. 36
The majority of courts have interpreted Katz as protecting only
"reasonable expectations of privacy. ' 3' The reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test was extracted from Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Katz. 38  Under Harlan's test, a defendant must show
that: (1) he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the area,
object, or activity upon which the government intruded; and
29. Id. at 348 n.1.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 353.
32. Id. at 357. See also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984). The
Supreme Court, however, has carved many exceptions to the warrant requirement. See
Shneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to search); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plain view); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)
(automobile exception); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to
arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967) (hot pursuit of a fleeing felon); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948)
(search to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence).
33. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-58.
34. Id. at 359.
35. Id. at 351. The Katz Court held that people, rather than places, are protected by
the fourth amendment. Id.
36. Id. at 351-52.
37. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). In Rakas, the Court adopted the
two-prong "reasonable expectation of privacy" test enunciated in Justice Harlan's Katz
opinion. Id. at 143 n.12.
38. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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(2) this expectation of privacy is one that society also considers
reasonable. 3" When a person thus exhibits a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, the government usually must comply with fourth
amendment strictures.4°
B. The Role of the Home, Curtilage, and Open
Fields After Katz
The trespass doctrine established a bright line rule concerning
the degree of fourth amendment protection afforded the home, cur-
tilage, and open fields.41 The fourth amendment never applied to
the open fields under the trespass doctrine.42 Instead, only physical
government intrusions of the home and curtilage constituted
fourth amendment searches.4 3 Although contemporary courts dif-
fer in their approach to this problem," distinctions concerning the
home, curtilage, and open fields have survived Katz. 45
1. The Home
The language of the fourth amendment unequivocally estab-
lishes the proposition that at the core of the amendment stands an
individual's right to retreat into the sanctity of his home and be
free from unreasonable government intrusions.4 6 Applying the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test to the home, Justice Harlan,
concurring in Katz, stated that an individual's home is a place
where he has a reasonable expectation of privacy.4 Nevertheless,
when an individual exposes activities within the home to "plain
view,"48 the fourth amendment no longer provides protection.49
39. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 358. See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49.
41. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
42. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
43. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928).
44. See Note, Curtilage, supra note 1, at 736-39 (discussion of the different ap-
proaches concerning the viability of the curtilage and open fields doctrines after Katz).
45. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986); California v. Ciraolo,
106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
46. See Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1825; Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1812; Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15
(1984); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S.
287, 292 (1984) (plurality opinion); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-12
(1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
48. Justice Harlan's use of the term "plain view" referred to unobstructed observa-
tion of incriminating evidence by a law enforcement officer from a place he reached with-
out violating the fourth amendment. State v. Rickard, 420 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 1982)
(when the officer is in a "non-constitutionally protected area" and views contraband, no
search has occurred). In essence, Justice Harlan's use of the term "plain view" alluded to
[Vol. 18
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For purposes of the fourth amendment, courts have treated pri-
vate commercial property and the home similarly."0 The business-
man, like the occupant of residential property, has a
"constitutional right to go about his business free from unreason-
able official entries upon his private commercial property." 5'
Although an owner of private commercial property is entitled to
freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusions, this does not
translate into freedom from all official intrusions.5 2 The Court has
held that certain periodic, warrantless administrative inspections
are constitutionally permissible.53 In the absence of a sufficiently
defined and regular program of warrantless inspections, however,
the fourth amendment's warrant requirement is applicable in the
commercial context.5 4
2. The Curtilage
As early as 1928, the Supreme Court extended to the curtilage
those fourth amendment protections traditionally afforded the
home. 5 Curtilage has been defined as the land and outbuildings
what some courts have described as "open view" observations. See, e.g., State v. Rickard,
420 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 1982); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 416-18, 570 P.2d 1323,
1326-27 (1977); State v. Layne, 623 S.W.2d 629, 634-35 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).
A distinction must be drawn between Justice Harlan's use of the term "plain view" and
the plain view doctrine of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The plain
view doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 470. It provides that
clearly visible evidence may be seized by the police without a warrant if: (1) the police
had a prior valid justification for the intrusion, (2) during the intrusion they came across
the evidence inadvertently, and (3) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immedi-
ately apparent when it was observed. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 n.4 (1983)
(plurality opinion).
49. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
50. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); G.M. Leasing
Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543
(1967).
51. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 543. But see Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S.
206, 211 (1966) (officers may be justified to be on business premises if there is an implied
invitation to the public to enter the premises).
52. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307, 315 (1978).
53. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981) (warrantless administrative
searches authorized by the Federal Mine and Safety Act of 1977); United States v. Bis-
well, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (the Gun Control Act of 1968 permitted warrantless ad-
ministrative inspections); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77
(1970) (statutory authorization for warrantless inspections of federally licensed dealers in
alcoholic beverages).
54. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 312-15; G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United
States, 429 U.S. at 358; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 543-46.
55. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928). For other cases ex-
tending fourth amendment protections to the curtilage, see Wattenburg v. United States,
388 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1968); McDowell v. United States, 383 F.2d 599, 603 (8th
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immediately surrounding the home. 6 Early cases protected the
curtilage from unreasonable searches by incorporating it within the
fourth amendment's use of the term "house."5 "
The curtilage concept has survived Katz.58 Contemporary
courts afford constitutional protection to the curtilage on the the-
ory that it is an extension of the home itself.5 9 In commercial set-
tings, the industrial curtilage also is afforded constitutional
protection when private business activities extend into the areas
immediately surrounding an industrial or commercial facility.6°
Cir. 1967); Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310, 313 (1st Cir. 1966); United States
v. Potts, 297 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1961); Hodges v. United States, 243 F.2d 281, 283 (5th
Cir. 1957); Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932
(1956); Hobson v. United States, 226 F.2d 890, 894 (8th Cir. 1955); Walker v. United
States, 225 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1955); Kroska v. United States, 51 F.2d 330, 333 (8th
Cir. 1931).
56. Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932
(1956). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Whether the place searched is within the curtilage is to be determined from the
facts including its proximity or annexation to the dwelling, its inclusion within
the general enclosure surrounding the dwelling, and its use and enjoyment as an
adjunct to the domestic economy of the family.
Id.
In urban settings the "curtilage" is generally treated as coextensive with a fenced yard.
See, e.g., Weaver v. United States, 295 F.2d 360, 360-61 (5th Cir. 1961). A case concern-
ing the residential boundaries of the curtilage currently is pending before the United
States Supreme Court. United States v. Dunn, No. 85-998 (argued Jan. 20, 1987).
57. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928); State v. Lee, 120
Or. 643, 648, 253 P. 533, 534 (1927); Bare v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 783, 795, 94 S.E.
168, 172 (1917).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 747 F.2d 537, 541-43 (9th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. 777, 788 n.8 (E.D. Cal. 1985); National Organization
for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945, 957 (N.D. Cal. 1985). But
see United States v. Bassford, 601 F. Supp. 1324, 1331 (D. Me. 1985) (no sound basis for
distinguishing between the curtilage and noncurtilage areas equally visible from the air);
State v. Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, 438, 367 N.W.2d 816, 820-21 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985)
(no distinction between curtilage areas that are visible from the public airways).
59. See, e.g., Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1968); Mc-
Dowell v. United States, 383 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1967); Care v. United States, 231
F.2d 22, 25 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956).
Under the trespass doctrine, fourth amendment protection of the home and curtilage
also had been extended to apartments, hotel rooms, garages, business offices and stores.
See, e.g., Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 158 (1964) (per curiam) (apartments); Stoner
v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (hotel rooms); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1,
5-6 (1931) (garage); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464-65 (1932) (business
office).
60. See United States v. Swart, 679 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1982) (defendant had reason-
able expectation of privacy in business curtilage); McDowell v. United States, 383 F.2d
599, 603 (8th Cir. 1967) (implied business curtilage did not exist).
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3. Open Fields
Unlike the home or curtilage, fourth amendment protection has
never extended to the open field.6' In 1924, the Supreme Court in
Hester v. United States62 first distinguished open fields from the
home.63 The Court perfunctorily ruled that the fourth amendment
protections accorded to individuals in their "persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects" did not extend to open fields.' 4 Thus, govern-
ment trespasses into open fields did not violate the fourth
amendment.65
Sixty years after Hester,66 the Supreme Court, in Oliver v. United
States,67 reaffirmed the vitality of the open fields doctrine. 61 In Oli-
ver, the Court addressed the relationship between the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test and the open fields doctrine.69  The
Court held that, other than activities in the area immediately adja-
cent to the home, an individual has no legitimate7° expectation of
privacy in outdoor endeavors.7 The Court in Oliver reasoned that
the Framers would not have interpreted open fields as a person,
house, paper, or effect.7 2 The Court concluded that activities in
open fields did not deserve scrupulous protection because those ac-
tivities were not the type of pursuits safeguarded by the fourth
amendment. 3
C. Aerial Surveillance
Among the lower courts, the distinction between open fields and
61. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984); Air Pollution Vari-
ance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974); Hester v. United States, 265
U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
62. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
63. Id. at 59.
64. Id.
65. Id. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 10, 2.4(a), at 331-338 (for general discussion of
the open fields doctrine).
66. See supra notes 62-65.
67. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
68. Id. at 181.
69. Id. Prior to Oliver, the Court in Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa
Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974), reaffirmed the open fields doctrine. 416 U.S. at 865. The
Court, however, did not discuss the relationship between the open fields doctrine and the
Katz test.
70. The terms "legitimate" and "reasonable" are used interchangeably. See Com-
ment, Curtilage or Open Fields?: Oliver v. United States Gives Renewed Significance to
the Concept of Curtilage in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 46 U. PiTrs. L. REV. 795, 809
n.87 (1985).
71. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180-81.
72. Id. at 178-80.
73. Id. at 180.
1986]
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curtilage has played an important role in determining the constitu-
tionality of warrantless aerial surveillance.74 The vast majority of
courts confronting fourth amendment challenges to aerial surveil-
lance have concluded that aerial observations of the open fields do
not constitute searches, which would trigger fourth amendment
protections." On the other hand, some courts have held that war-
rantless aerial surveillance of the curtilage constitutes an unreason-
able search under the fourth amendment. 6 For example, one
federal district court has found that repeated helicopter buzzing,
hovering, and "dive bombings" in residential areas by law enforce-
ment officials violated the fourth amendment.77 The court relied
upon the excessive intrusiveness of the government activity in de-
termining that the activity amounted to a search. 8 In the absence
of a warrant, the court concluded that the government's actions
violated the fourth amendment.79
In assessing fourth amendment challenges to aerial surveillances,
several lower courts have evaluated the potency and intrusiveness
of the surveillance.80 Those courts have suggested that low altitude
74. Compare National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F.
Supp. 945, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (surveillance of the curtilage area deserves constitutional
protection); People v. Agee, 153 Cal. App. 3d 1169 (omitted), 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 836-37
(1984) (reasonable for an individual to expect privacy from aerial surveillance of curti-
lage) with People v. Lashmett, 71 Ill. App. 3d 429, 437, 389 N.E.2d 888, 894 (1979)
(warrantless aerial observations of open fields do not violate the fourth amendment), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980). See also People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 540-43, 108
Cal. Rptr. 146, 149-51 (1973) (the nature of the property aerially observed is one of the
factors to take into account in a fourth amendment inquiry).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Marbury, 732 F.2d 390, 398-99 (5th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512, 513-15 (E.D. Ky. 1980); United States v. DeBacker,
493 F. Supp. 1078, 1081 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Tuttle v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d
320, 327, 174 Cal. Rptr. 576, 579, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1033 (1981); People v. Joubert,
118 Cal. App. 3d 637, 642-48, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428, 431-34 (1981); People v. St. Amour,
104 Cal. App. 3d 886, 889-94, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187, 189-92 (1980); Burkholder v. Superior
Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 425-26, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86, 88-89 (1979); Dean v. Superior
Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 118-19, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589-90 (1973), Randall v. State,
458 So. 2d 822, 825-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476,
476-78, 277 S.E.2d 923, 925-26, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981); State v. Layne, 623
S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).
76. National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp.
945, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1985); People v. Agee, 153 Cal. App. 3d 1169 (omitted), 200 Cal.
Rptr. 827, 833-34 (1984); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 540-43, 108 Cal. Rptr.
146, 149-51 (1973).
77. National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp.
945, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
78. Id. at 955-61.
79. Id. at 965.
80. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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flying,8' the use of sophisticated viewing aids, 2 and the frequency 3
and duration of aerial surveillance"4 should be considered in deter-
mining the "reasonableness" of an expectation of privacy.85 A ma-
jority of those courts have concluded that government aerial
surveillance is unintrusive, and thus an individual does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in areas visible from the air.8 6 A
81. See People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973). In Sneed,
the court held that aerial observations from an altitude of twenty-five feet constituted an
unreasonable government intrusion of defendant's privacy in his backyard. Id. at 543,
108 Cal. Rptr. at 151. Several courts have suggested that the height of the surveillance is
a factor in considering the reasonableness of the intrusion. See, e.g., National Organiza-
tion for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945, 958-61 (N.D. Cal.
1985); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1080-81 (W.D. Mich. 1980); State
v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 418-19, 570 P.2d 1323, 1327-28 (1977); State v. Roode, 643
S.W.2d 651, 652-54 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Layne, 623 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1981).
In determining the reasonableness of the altitude, some courts have referred to federal
regulations. See, e.g., People v. Agee, 153 Cal. App. 3d 1169 (omitted), 200 Cal. Rptr.
827, 830 (1984); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 418-19, 570 P.2d 1323, 1327 (1977). In
congested areas, federal aviation regulations prohibit fixed-wing aircrafts from flying
lower than 1000 feet above the highest obstacle. 14 C.F.R. 91.79(b) (1986). In noncon-
gested areas, an aircraft must be operated above an altitude of 500 feet. 14 C.F.R.
91.79(c). Helicopters, on the other hand, may be operated at less than these minimum
altitudes. 14 C.F.R. 91.79(d).
82. See, e.g., State v. Knight, 63 Haw. 90, 621 P.2d 370 (1980); State v. Stachler, 58
Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977). In Stachler, the court ruled that aerial observations
with binoculars of defendant's field was constitutionally permissible. 58 Haw. at 421 n.6,
570 P.2d at 1329 n.6 (1977). The court, however, cautioned that warrantless aerial obser-
vations with "highly sophisticated viewing devices" might violate the state constitutional
prohibitions against governmental invasion of privacy. Id. at 419, 570 P.2d at 1328.
Three years later in State v. Knight, 63 Haw. 90, 621 P.2d 370 (1980), the court ruled
that a warrant is a prerequisite for the use of technologically aided devices that allow
observations of areas not normally visible to the naked eye. Id. at 93-94, 621 P.2d at 373.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 853 (1981) (frequency is a factor to be weighed in determining the justification
for the surveillance); National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen,
608 F. Supp. 945, 955-58 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (the frequency of aerial surveillance was an
important consideration in determining the intrusiveness of the surveillance).
84. See, e.g., State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 419, 570 P.2d 1323, 1327-28 (1977)
(continual aerial surveillance for long periods of time enhances the intrusiveness of the
aerial surveillance).
85. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. See also Note, Curtilage, supra
note 1, at 746-48.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Marbury, 732 F.2d 390, 398-99 (5th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1380-81 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981);
United States v. Broadhurst, 612 F. Supp. 777, 795 (E.D. Cal. 1985); United States v.
Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512, 515 (E.D. Ky. 1980); United States v. DeBacker, 493 F.
Supp. 1078, 1081 (-W.D. Mich. 1980); People v. Mayoff, 150 Cal. App. 3d 7 (omitted),
197 Cal. Rptr. 450, 452-54 (1984); Tuttle v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 320, 324-
27, 174 Cal. Rptr. 576, 579, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1033 (1981); People v. Joubert, 118
Cal. App. 3d 637, 642-48, 173 Cal. Rptr. 428, 431-34 (1981); People v. St. Amour, 104
Cal. App. 3d 886, 889-94, 163 Cal. Rptr. 187, 189-92 (1980); Burkholder v. Superior
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 18
minority of courts, however, have found aerial surveillance by the
government intrusive and violative of an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy in outdoor activities.87 The Supreme Court
recently considered the intrusiveness of aerial surveillance in Cali-
fornia v. Cirialo8 8 and Dow Chemical Co. v. United States.8 9
III. DISCUSSION
A. California v. Ciraolo
1. The Facts
An anonymous tipster informed the police that marijuana plants
were growing in the backyard of a Santa Clara residence. 90 An
officer located the home and conducted a ground level investiga-
tion.9' His observations proved fruitless because a six foot outer
fence and a ten foot inner fence enclosed the backyard.92 To pur-
sue the investigation, the officer chartered an airplane and flew
over the defendant's house.93 The officer and another officer who
accompanied him on the flight were trained in marijuana indentifi-
cation.94 At an altitude of one thousand feet, the officers identified
marijuana plants growing in the fenced area adjacent to the
home.95 On the basis of information obtained from the aerial expe-
dition, a magistrate issued a search warrant for the defendant's
home, attached garage, and ground areas. 96 Thereafter, the officers
executed the warrant and seized marijuana plants from the defend-
Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 425-26, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86, 88-89 (1979); People v. Superior,
37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 839-41, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764, 765-66 (1973); Dean v. Superior Court,
35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 116-19, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589-90 (1973); Randall v. State, 458 So.
2d 822, 825-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 476, 476-78,
277 S.E.2d 923, 925-26, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981); State v. Knight, 63 Haw. 90,
93, 621 P.2d 370, 373 (1980); State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 419, 570 P.2d 1323, 1329
(1977); State v. Rogers, 100 N.M. 517, 518-19, 673 P.2d 142, 143-44 (N.M. Ct. App.
1983); State v. Roode, 643 S.W.2d 651, 652-54 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Layne, 623 S.W.2d
629, 635 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, 438, 367 N.W.2d
816, 820-21 (Ct. App. 1985).
87. See, e.g., National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F.
Supp. 945, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1985); People v. Agee, 153 Cal. App. 3d 1169 (omitted); 200
Cal. Rptr. 827, 833-34 (1984); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 540-43, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 146, 149-51 (1973).
88. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
89. Id. at 1819.
90. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1810 (1986).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1809-10.
95. Id. at 1810.
96. Id. at 1814 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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ant's curtilage. 97
After the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress
the evidence, the defendant pleaded guilty to a cultivation of mari-
juana charge. 9 The California Court of Appeals reversed the con-
viction and ordered the suppression of the fruits of the aerial
search.9 9 The court viewed the officers' investigation of the defend-
ant's curtilage as an unauthorized intrusion into the sanctity of the
home."° Consequently, the court ruled that the warrantless over-
flight was an unreasonable search in violation of the fourth amend-
ment.' 0 1 The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted
certiorari to review this holding. 10 2
2. The Majority Opinion
In a five-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed. 0 3 The ma-
jority held that deliberate"° aerial observations of the curtilage of
defendant's home did not amount to a search. 1 5 In reaching this
result, the majority applied the two-prong Katz test. 106 Chief Jus-
tice Burger, writing for the majority, conceded that the defendant
had manifested a subjective intent to maintain privacy in his curti-
lage. 107 The Court, however, concluded that society was unwilling
to recognize the defendant's expectation of privacy as
reasonable. 108
Chief Justice Burger asserted that the two fences surrounding
the defendant's backyard did not shield the curtilage from the view
of the public flying in the airspace. 10 9 The Court determined that
the police officers, like any member of the public, had the right to
fly in the public navigable airspace. 10 Thus, the Court concluded
that, because the officers had viewed the defendant's curtilage from
97. Id.
98. Id. The defendant violated CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 11358 (West 1986).
99. People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1085, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 94 (1984).
100. Id. at 1089-90, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97-98.
101. Id. at 1090, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
102. 105 S. Ct. 2672 (1985) (order granting certiorari).
103. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1808, 1813.
104. The Court stated that there was no rational distinction between focused observa-
tions and routine patrol. Id. at 1813 n.2.
105. Id. at 1813. The officers also took a picture of the defendant's backyard with a
statndard thirty-five millimeter camera. The use of the camera was not an issue in
Ciraolo. Id. at 1812 n.1.
106. Id. at 1811. See supra text accompanying note 39.
107. Id. at 1811-12.
108. Id. at 1812-13.
109. Id. at 1812.
110. Id. at 1813.
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a public vantage point, their aerial observations did not represent
an activity protected by the fourth amendment.'
3. The Dissent
Justice Powell, writing in dissent, criticized the Court for its sig-
nificant departure from the standard developed in Katz. " 2 The dis-
sent noted that Katz had announced a standard that could meet the
technological changes in law enforcement methods." 3  Under
Katz, a government surveillance that invaded a "constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy" amounted to a
search.' The dissent also recognized that a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy is not based on the presence or absence of a physical
government intrusion.' " Thus, the Ciraolo dissent reasoned that
the Court's analysis provided no real protection from surveillance
techniques that do not involve a physical trespass.' 6
The dissent also criticized the majority for not distinguishing po-
lice observations from the ordinary observations of air travelers." 7
As noted by the dissent, the risk that air passengers will obtain a
"fleeting, anonymous, and nondiscriminating glimpse" of private
activities and then connect those activities with the people involved
is almost nonexistent. 18 Consequently, the dissent argued that this
risk does not obliterate an individual's expectation of privacy in his
curtilage. 19 The dissent also noted that the overflight, conducted
by police with the intention of discovering crime, had intruded into
a private area which, absent a warrant, would have been constitu-
tionally forbidden at groundlevel. 2 o Accordingly, the dissent con-
11. Id.
112. Id. at 1814 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
joined in the dissent.
In analyzing the Court's treatment of aerial surveillance, Justice Powell reiterated Jus-
tice Harlan's warning in Katz that "any decision to construe the Fourth Amendment as
proscribing only physical intrusions by police onto private property 'is, in the present
day, bad physics as well as bad law....' " 106 S. Ct. at 1814 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967)). Furthermore, the dissent
argued that "[r]eliance on the manner of surveillance is directly contrary to the standard
of Katz, which identifies a constitutionally protected privacy right by focusing on the
interests of the individual and of a free society." Id. at 1817 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1815 (Powell, J., dissenting).
115. Id..
116. Id..
117. Id. at 1818 (Powell, J., dissenting).
118. Id..
119. Id..
120. Id..
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cluded that warrantless aerial observations of the curtilage
similarly should constitute an unreasonable search.12 '
B. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States
1. The Facts
The controversy in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States 2 2 arose
out of efforts by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to
check emissions from the power houses located on Dow Chemical
Company's ("Dow") Midland facility. 23  After Dow had con-
sented to a ground-level inspection of its two thousand acre facility
in Midland, Michigan, the EPA requested a second inspection in
order to photograph the facility.' 24 Dow denied this request.' 25
Dow had a policy of prohibiting the use of camera equipment by
anyone other than authorized personnel and had enacted a pro-
gram to protect the facility from aerial photography. 126 Short of
erecting a roof over the facility, Dow took elaborate precautions to
secure the facility from any unwelcomed intrusions.'27
The EPA hired a commercial photographer to take photographs
of the Dow facility.' 28 Using a twenty-two thousand dollar aerial
mapping camera, the photographer took approximately seventy-
five color photographs of various parts of the manufacturing facil-
ity.' 29 The EPA failed to procure an administrative warrant for
this activity. 30
When Dow became aware of the aerial photography, it filed suit
in district court, alleging that the EPA's actions violated the fourth
121. Id. at 1819 (Powell, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 1819.
123. Id. at 1828 (Powell, J., dissenting). Specifically, the EPA was searching for vio-
lations of federal air quality standards. Id.
124. Id. at 1822.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1828 (Powell, J., dissenting). Dow had instructed its employees that when
suspicious overflights occur, the employees had to attempt to obtain the plane's identifica-
tion number and description. Id. In the event that Dow learned that the facility had
been photographed, Dow had a policy of preventing the dissemination of the photo-
graphs. Id.
127. Id. Dow had spent over thirty million dollars for security in the ten year time
period preceding the suit. Id. at 1828 n.2. An eight foot chain link fence surrounded
Dow's two thousand acre facility. Id. at 1828. The facility was guarded by security
personnel and monitored by closed-circuit televisions. Id. In addition, motion detectors,
which indicate the movement of persons within restricted areas, were placed in the facil-
ity. Id.
128. Id. at 1822.
129. Id. at 1829 (Powell, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1822.
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amendment and were beyond the EPA's statutory authority under
the Clean Air Act. 1 3  The district court agreed with Dow's posi-
tion on both issues and permanently enjoined the EPA from taking
aerial photographs of Dow's premises. 132 After the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed,' 33 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 34
2. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 35 The Court ruled that neither the fourth
amendment nor the Clean Air Act prohibited photography of an
industrial complex from navigable airspace. 36
Congress has granted certain investigatory and enforcement au-
thority to the EPA under section 114(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act.131
Section 1 14(a)(2) provides that an EPA representative has the right
to enter commercial premises upon the presentation of Agency cre-
dentials.'38 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, deter-
131. Id.
132. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1366 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
The district court found that Dow manifested an expectation of privacy in its exposed
plant areas because it intentionally surrounded them with buildings and other enclosures.
Id. at 1364-66. The court found this expectation of privacy to be reasonable because of
the trade secret protections restricting Dow's commercial competitors from taking aerial
photographs of these exposed areas. Id. at 1367.
133. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1984).
134. 105 S. Ct. 2700 (1985) (order granting certiorari).
135. Dow Chemical, 105 S. Ct. 1819, 1824, 1827 (1986).
136. Id.
137. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7414 (1983). Section 7414 provides, in pertinent
part:
(a)(2) the Administrator or his authorized representative, upon presentation
of his credentials-
(A) shall have a right of entry to, upon, or through any premises of such
person or in which any records required to be maintained under paragraph (1)
of this section are located, and
(B) may at reasonable times have access to and copy any records, inspect
any monitoring equipment or method required under paragraph (1), and sample
any emissions which such person is required to sample under paragraph (l)....
(c) Any records, reports or information obtained under subsection (a) of this
section shall be available to the public, except that upon a showing satisfactory
to the Administrator by any person that records, reports, or information, or
particular part thereof, (other than emission data) to which the Administrator
has access under this section if made public, would divulge methods or
processes entitled to protection as trade secrets of such person, the Administra-
tor shall consider such record, report, or information or particular portion
thereof confidential ....
Id.
138. Id.
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mined that section 114(a) did not limit the EPA's general powers
to investigate, 13 9 but instead permitted the EPA to employ any
method of observation commonly available to the general public. ,40
Consequently, the majority concluded that the use of aerial obser-
vations and photography was within the EPA's statutory
authority. '4'
Chief Justice Burger next addressed the fourth amendment is-
sue.142 The Court conceded that a business establishment or an
industrial facility enjoys certain fourth amendment protection.1 43
The Court, however, distinguished fourth amendment protection
of the curtilage and open fields, finding that the intimate activities
associated with the home and its curtilage do not extend into the
outdoor areas or spaces between structures and buildings of a man-
ufacturing plant.' 14 Although the Court acknowledged that Dow's
plant lacked the critical characteristics of both the curtilage and
the open fields, the Court concluded that for purposes of determin-
ing the constitutionality of warrantless aerial surveillance, Dow's
manufacturing facility resembled an open field.145 Consequently,
the Court concluded that the area surrounding Dow's plant did not
deserve constitutional protection. 146
In reaching its result, the Court distinguished ground-level in-
trusions from aerial intrusions. 47 Under the Court's analysis,
Dow maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy from ground-
level intrusions because the public did not have access to the open
areas of the plant. 41 On the other hand, because the general public
could have observed Dow's facility from the airspace, the Court
concluded that the government did not have to comply with the
fourth amendment in conducting non-physical warrantless inspec-
tions of commercial property. 49
The Court also noted that the EPA's actions were not overly
intrusive. 50 In this context, the Court compared the use of preci-
sion mapping cameras to the use of "highly sophisticated surveil-
139. Dow Chemical, 106 . Ct. at 1824.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1825.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1827.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1825-26.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1826.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1826-27.
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lance equipment not generally available to the public" and
determined that the use of unique sensory devices might raise con-
stitutional problems absent the utilization of a warrant.' The
Court, however, concluded that the government's use of a camera
did not amount to a search under the fourth amendment because it
merely enhanced human vision and because it was available to the
public. 1 52
3. The Dissent
The partial dissent'53 strongly rejected the Court's fourth
amendment analysis and holding.154 Justice Powell, writing in dis-
sent, criticized the Court for the drastic reduction in fourth amend-
ment protection previously afforded private commercial
property. l5 The dissent noted that fourth amendment protection
of business premises had deep historical roots."5 6 Moreover, the
dissent observed that the Supreme Court had never held that war-
rantless intrusions on commercial property were generally accepta-
ble."' Accordingly, the dissent specified that business property
could be subjected to warrantless searches only in those instances
when Congress has made a reasonable determination that warrant-
less inspection is necessary to enforce a regulatory purpose and
when the federal regulatory presence is adequately defined.' 5  Be-
cause the Clean Air Act did not authorize warrantless inspections,
the dissent concluded that the exception to the warrant require-
ment was inapplicable. 1'5 9
The dissent also criticized the Court for retreating from Katz. 60
Unlike the majority's analysis, Katz did not rely upon the presence
or absence of a physical trespass to find a fourth amendment
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1827.
153. Id. The dissenters agreed with the majority's position on the Clean Air Act is-
sue, but took issue with the remainder of the majority decision. Id.
154. Id. at 1827-34 (Powell, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1830 (Powell, J., dissenting).
156. Id. The dissent pointed out that " 'the particular offensiveness' of the general
warrant and writ of assistance, so despised by the Framers of the Constitution, 'was
acutely felt by merchants and businessmen whose premises and products were inspected'
under their authority." Id. (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 336 U.S. 307, 312
(1978)). As a result, the ban on warrantless searches included businesses as well as resi-
dences. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1830 (Powell, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1831 (Powell, J., dissenting).
158. Id. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
159. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1830-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 1831-33 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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search.'16  Under Katz, a search occurred when the government
intruded on a reasonable expectation that a certain area would re-
main private.162 Applying the Katz test, Justice Powell argued that
an expectation of privacy would be recognized as reasonable if it
was rooted in "understandings that are recognized and permitted
by society."' 63 Thus, by enacting trade secret laws, the dissent
found that society recognized as reasonable Dow's interest in pre-
serving the privacy of its outdoor manufacturing facility. 164 Be-
cause Dow had taken every feasible step to protect trade secrets
from the public, the dissent concluded that the government's war-
rantless aerial surveillance violated Dow's reasonable expectation
of privacy. 165
Justice Powell further noted that, pursuant to the majority's in-
quiry, the existence of an asserted privacy interest will be decided
by the manner of surveillance. 166 Thus, the dissent warned that as
technology becomes available to the public, fourth amendment
protection gradually will decay. 167
IV. ANALYSIS
An investigatory technique that does not constitute a search
need not comply with the dictates of the fourth amendment. 16
Accordingly, such a technique may be employed without a war-
rant, regardless of the circumstances surrounding its use. 69 The
Court in Ciraolo and Dow Chemical held that the use of an airplane
and the use of a precision, commercial mapping camera in the nav-
igable airspace did not constitute a search.'I " In determining that
these techniques were not searches, the Court has paved the way
for technology to override fourth amendment protections. 17 1
A. Critique of Ciraolo
Ciraolo, like Dow Chemical, is a case born of technological inno-
vation. The availability of aircrafts permits law enforcement of-
161. Id. at 1831 (Powell, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 1831-32 (Powell, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1832 (Powell, J., dissenting).
164. Id..
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1833 (Powell, J., dissenting).
167. Id..
168. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 136-37 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1827; Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
171. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 137-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ficers to aerially observe private residential property. 172
Consequently, the outdoor areas of the curtilage are exposed to the
plain view of the officer in navigable airspace. 173 Ciraolo holds, as a
matter of law, that the curtilage does not deserve any fourth
amendment protection from warrantless "naked-eye" aerial sur-
veillance.174 Hence, an expectation of privacy can be defeated by
the use of an aircraft that lifts a law enforcement officer's gaze
above a fence. 75
The Court in Ciraolo examined the interests of the individual
and law enforcement to determine whether a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy existed. 176 The Court determined that, because the
defendant knowingly exposed his marijuana garden to anyone trav-
eling in the navigable airspace, a reasonable expectation of privacy
did not exist. 177 But, as Justice Powell aptly illustrated in his dis-
sent, the risk that the general public flying in the airspace would
see the defendant's marijuana garden and then connect it with the
defendant is almost non-existent. 7 1 Moreover, it should be noted
that the public is not trained in marijuana identification as were the
officers who conducted the investigative flight.' 79  Thus, the
Court's reliance on the tenuous distinction of knowing exposure
necessarily "raises the question of how tightly the fourth amend-
ment permits people to be driven back into the recesses of their
lives by the risk of surveillance."18
The nature of the item revealed through the use of aerial surveil-
lance belies the outcome reached by the Court.' 8' The Court im-
172. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1817 (Powell, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 1812-13. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. But see People v.
Agee, 153 Cal. App. 3d 1169 (omitted), 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 834-36 (1984) ("To say that
anything which can be seen from a lawful vantage point in the air is in 'plain view' simply
confuses what could be seen with what should be seen.").
174. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
175. Id. In interpreting Ciraolo, the California Court of Appeals has distinguished
observations in the navigable airspace from those in the non-navigable airspace. People v.
Sabo, 185 Cal. App. 3d 845, 854, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170, 176 (1986). The Sabo court held
that warrantless helicopter views from the non-navigable airspace of marijuana growing
in a greenhouse constituted an unreasonable search. Id.
176. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812-13.
177. Id. at 1813.
178. Id. at 1818 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell noted that travelers on both
commercial and private planes normally obtain only a "fleeting, anonymous, and nondis-
criminating glimpse of the landscape and building below them." Id.
179. See supra text accompanying note 94.
180. W. LAFAVE, supra note 10, 2.2, at 260-61 (quoting Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 402 (1974)).
181. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812 (whether the defendant merely manifested a hope
that no one would observe his unlawful gardening pursuits is not entirely clear). See
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plicitly stated that even in the curtilage of his home, a person
cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband.1 8 2
Indirectly, the Court determined that a reasonable expectation of
privacy protects only legal activities.8 3  Thus, because aerial sur-
veillance revealed that the defendant was guilty of cultivating mari-
juana, the fourth amendment did not restrict the government's
surveillance activities.8 4 In light of the availability of intrusive
investigating techniques, including aerial surveillance, 8 1 chemical
testing, 8 6 and trained dogs,8 7 the possible ramifications of the
Ciraolo Court's reasoning are staggering. Under Ciraolo, fourth
amendment rights lack stability and will dissipate as technology
progresses.
B. Critique of Dow Chemical
Dow Chemical marks a drastic reduction in fourth amendment
protection afforded to owners of private businesses or industrial
premises. 18  The Dow Chemical Court indicated that the expecta-
tion of privacy that the owner of a business possesses significantly
differs from the expectation of privacy that an individual enjoys in
his dwelling. 189 The Court failed, however, to distinguish the lim-
ited category of permissible warrantless administrative inspections
from the EPA's warrantless photography. 9 °
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the chemical identity of contraband); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (dic-
tum) (canine sniff not a search because it disclosed only the presence of narcotics).
182. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
183. Id. See Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent,
81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1244-48 (1983) [hereinafter Loewy, Device]; Loewy, Protecting
Citizens from Cops and Crooks: An Assessment of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment During the 1982 Term, 62 N.C.L. REV. 329 (1984). Professor
Loewey strongly advocates a fourth amendment that protects only the innocent rather
the guilty. The guilty would be protected by the amendment only to the extent necessary
to protect the innocent. See Loewy, Device, supra at 1244-48.
184. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
185. Id. at 1813.
186. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). Jacobsen involved chemical test-
ing of a substance already in the government's possession. The Court found that an
individual cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband. Id. at 126.
187. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). In Place, the Court stated that an
individual may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the presence or absence of
narcotics in his luggage from a "canine sniff." Id. at 707. The validity of the canine sniff
in that case, however, was neither briefed by the parties nor addressed by the court below.
Id. at 723-24. See Gardner, Sniffing for Drugs in the Classroom-Perspectives on Fourth
Amendment Scope, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 803, 844-47 (1980) (discussion of "canine sniffs").
188. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1828 (Powell, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 1826.
190. Id. at 1830-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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The Court primarily looked to the "intrusiveness" of the govern-
ment investigatory technique in determining whether Dow had a
reasonable expectation of privacy.' 9 ' The Court refused to attach
significance to the fact that the EPA's mapping camera could film
much more than members of the general public could see by glanc-
ing down at Dow's facility. 92 Instead, the Court determined that
the manner in which the photographs were obtained did not give
rise to constitutional problems because no identifiable human faces
or trade secret documents appeared on the photographs. 93
Under the Dow Chemical analysis, it appears that constitutional
protection may arise only when significant information is revealed
through the use of overly intrusive surveillance techniques.194 For
example, the Court noted that electronic eavesdropping devices
raised far more serious problems than the use of a sophisticated
camera because eavesdropping devices might record confidential
discussions of chemical formulae or trade secrets. 9 5 Thus, the
Dow Chemical opinion implicitly suggested that the use of the cam-
era in the airspace did not constitute a search because the film ob-
tained therefrom merely outlined the facility's building and
equipment without sufficiently capturing glimpses of private
activities. 196
Nonetheless, the Court determined that the use of unique or
novel law enforcement devices and its unavailability to the public
might require constitutional safeguards. 197 The government's use
of devices available to the public, however, was not even a search
for purposes of the fourth amendment.' 98 This distinction is ab-
surd: in an age of advancing and potentially unlimited technology,
191. Id. at 1826-27.
192. Id. at 1827. For example, "some of the photographs taken from directly above
the plant at 1,200 feet [were] capable of enlargement to a scale of 1 inch equals 20 feet or
greater without significant loss of detail or resolution." Id. at 1829 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(quoting Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (E.D. Mich.
1982)) (emphasis in original).
193. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1827 n.5.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1827.
196. Id. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). There, the Court held that the
use of a pen register to record the local numbers dialed from a private telephone was not
a search because the defendant voluntarily conveyed the numbers to the telephone com-
pany's switching equipment. Id. at 743-46. The majority distinguished Katz on the
ground that a pen register was far less intrusive than bugging a telephone because the pen
register did not disclose the contents of the telephone conversation. Id. at 741. The
Court concluded that a privacy interest in the numbers dialed from a telephone did not
compel fourth amendment protection. Id. at 745-46.
197. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1826-27.
198. Id.
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the fourth amendment will become moribund.' 99
C. The Aftermath of Ciraolo and Dow Chemical
Ciraolo and Dow Chemical, read together, indicate a doctrinal
change in the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.
Although Katz overruled the trespass doctrine, the Courts in
Ciraolo and Dow Chemical, by distinguishing ground-level intru-
sions from aerial intrusions, have reestablished notions of that dis-
credited trespass doctrine.2°
Ciraolo and Dow Chemical also have qualified the method of de-
termining the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy.20 '
Katz placed its emphasis upon the individual interest to be pro-
tected.2 °2 In stark contrast, Ciraolo and Dow Chemical focused
upon the government's means of violating an individual's inter-
est.203 Accordingly, under Ciraolo and Dow Chemical, the out-
come of the reasonable expectation of privacy standard is
determined by the "intrusiveness" of the government's activity.2"
Hence, government conduct that is intrusive constitutes a search,
while conduct that is unintrusive does not.20 5
In determining the "intrusiveness" of the government's conduct,
the Courts balanced the nature of the property observed against
199. Id. at 1833 (Powell, J., dissenting). See People v. Agee, 153 Cal. App. 3d 1169
(omitted), 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 835 (1984). Under the Dow Chemical analysis, if the spe-
cific method of surveillance involved the aerial use of an x-ray machine and x-ray ma-
chines were available to the general public, then a person would have to install lead
insulation around his home or business to have a "reasonable" expectation of privacy in
the area observed. See Note, Curtilage, supra note 1, at 752-53.
To protect against the use of aerial sensory devices such as a camera, the Dow Chemi-
cal Court implied that a lead roof or an opaque dome must be erected. Dow Chemical,
106 S. Ct. at 1826-27. Consequently, the Dow Chemical approach could require busi-
nesses to take unrealistic measures to protect against a specific method of surveillance.
Id. at 1828 (Powell, J., dissenting).
A business would have to spend millions of dollars to erect a covered enclosure over its
commercial property to protect against photography taken in the navigable airspace. Id.
at 1828 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
200. See Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1826 (actual physical entry by the EPA would
raise substantially different questions); Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812-13 (search did not
occur since officers did not physically intrude onto the defendant's land).
201. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1827 (satellite technology is intrusive, aerial pho-
tography is not); Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813 (private and commercial flights are not intru-
sive because they are routine).
202. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
203. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1826-27; Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
204. See Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1827; Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813. See also
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-45 (1979) (Court implies that a pen register is not
intrusive).
205. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1827; Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
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the nature of the surveillance method employed.2"6 In Ciraolo, the
Court determined that naked-eye observations of the curtilage by
the police in the navigable airspace did not amount to fourth
amendment activity because plain view observations are not overly
intrusive." 7 As a result, an individual cannot manifest a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the outdoor areas of their residential
property from naked-eye aerial surveillance.2"'
Similarly, under Dow Chemical, a business cannot rely on the
fourth amendment to shield its private outdoor areas from aerial
surveillance. 20 9 Unlike the utilization of the standard thirty-five
millimeter camera in Ciraolo, the government's use of a sensory
enhancement device in the navigable airspace could have provided
the Dow Chemical Court with a means for finding that the govern-
ment's activities violated the fourth amendment.21 0 The Court,
however, held that the use of a camera in the navigable airspace
was not so intrusive as to trigger constitutional protection.2 1" ' The
Court reached this seemingly anomalous result for two reasons.
First, the Court determined that the property observed was not
analogous to the curtilage.21 2 Second, the Court noted that the
camera was not a highly sophisticated piece of surveillance equip-
ment that was unavailable to the general public.2"3 Hence, the
fourth amendment cannot be utilized to judicially monitor the gov-
ernment's aerial use of sensory equipment to observe private com-
mercial premises."'
Reading Ciraolo and Dow Chemical together suggests a possible
fourth amendment distinction between residential and commercial
property.2"5 The Dow Chemical Court determined that greater lati-
tude is granted the government to conduct warrantless inspections
of commercial property than of residential property.21 6 Commer-
cial property can be aerially observed with sensory enhancement
devices. 21 7 The government's use of sensory equipment to observe
aerially the curtilage of an individual's home, however, may create
206. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1824-27; Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812-13.
207. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
208. Id.
209. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
210. Id. at 1824.
211. Id. at 1824-27.
212. Id. at 1824-25.
213. Id. at 1826-27.
214. Id.
215. Compare Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1826-27 with Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
216. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1826.
217. Id. at 1827.
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future constitutional problems.218 Notice that if Ciraolo sets forth a
blanket statement that all aerial observations of the curtilage are
not searches, it would be unnecessary for the Court in Dow Chemi-
cal to distinguish the government's aerial use of a precision camera
to observe open fields from the use of such a camera to observe the
curtilage.2 19 This distinction suggests that the use of enhancement
devices to view the curtilage of a home would be far more intrusive
than the use of enhancement devices on commercial premises. 220
Thus, under the Ciraolo-Dow Chemical analysis, an individual may
have a "reasonable" expectation of privacy from the aerial use of
enhancement devices to observe the curtilage of the home.22 '
Furthermore, it should be noted that the Dow Chemical Court
distinguished enhancement devices from highly technical sensory
equipment.222 Under the Court's analysis, it appears that the use
of highly technical sensory equipment in residential premises and
in private commercial premises would be overly "intrusive. "223 In
the wake of Dow Chemical and Ciraolo, the factual determination
of whether the government has employed highly technical sensory
equipment must be litigated on a case by case basis. If courts,
however, solely look to the availability of an investigatory tech-
nique to the public, then fourth amendment protection will decay
as "sophisticated" surveillance techniques become available to the
public.224 Consequently, to preserve the integrity of the individ-
ual's interest in the fourth amendment, lower courts must nar-
rowly construe Ciraolo and Dow Chemical.225  Otherwise,
reasonable expectations of privacy in residential and commercial
property will shrivel as technology marches forward.226
218. Id. at 1824-25.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1833 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the Court applied the
curtilage doctrine, "which affords heightened protection to homeowners, in a manner
that eviscerates the protection traditionally given to the owner of commercial property."
Id.
221. The Ciraolo Court only addressed naked-eye aerial observations of the curtilage.
Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
222. Dow Chemical, 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
223. Id. at 1826-27.
224. Id. at 1833 (Powell, J., dissenting).
225. See supra note 206-212 and accompanying text. See also People v. Sabo, 185
Cal. App. 3d 845, 853, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170, 175 (1986) (limiting the application of Ciraolo
and Dow Chemical to government observations from the navigable airspace).
226. See People v. Agee, 153 Cal. App. 3d 1169 (omitted), 200 Cal. Rptr. 827, 830
(1984) (if the law does not keep pace with advancing technology in law enforcement
surveillance techniques, expectations of privacy may be earthbound).
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V. CONCLUSION
The expense society pays for the benefits of warrantless aerial
surveillance is the relinquishment of privacy in most outdoor areas.
Only when families and business proprietors retreat behind the
walls of their homes and businesses will the fear of being observed
by the government's omniscient "eye in the sky" subside. Unless
the courts narrowly interpret Ciraolo and Dow Chemical, an
Orwellian "age where everyone is open to surveillance at all times"
may well be upon us. 227
ANITA K. MODAK-TRURAN
227. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 341 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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